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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellee's Statement of Facts contains errors and 
misstates the evidence that was presented to the Court. 
Dr. Stewart's evaluation and subsequent recommendation was 
done 8-9 months before the Trial and was not updated and the 
Court did not adequately consider the stability of the minor 
child during said period of time and the child's relationship 
with her sister, Brandi. 
The visitation awarded to the plaintiff by the Court was 
restrictive and was not as liberal as the visitation that was 
allowed to the defendant during the pendency of the action and, 
further, was not based upon the evidence before the Court. Said 
restrictive award of visitation was clearly inequitable to the 
plaintiff and manifested an abuse of discretion. 
The Court misinterpreted the evidence represented in 
regards to the evaluation costs of Dr. Stewart and it was clearly 
inequitable to order the plaintiff to pay $1,500.00 to the 
defendant for Dr. Stewart and manifested an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OP PACTS CONTAINED ERRORS 
AND MISSTATES THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
In paragraph 2 of Appellee's Statement of Pacts he 
insinuates that he did not know the child was born until four 
1 
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days after the birth. However, the defendant, in his own 
admission, indicated that he was told about the birth of the 
child the day after the child's birth. (Vol. II, T. 158-159) 
In paragraph 5 of Appellee's Statement of Facts he 
indicates that Dr. Stewart talked with Paige's day care provider 
which is inaccurate. Dr. Stewart only talked to the day care 
provider for the half-sister, Brandi, at the time Dr. Stewart did 
her evaluation since the minor child, Paige, was not in day care 
at that time. 
In paragraph 8 of Appellee's Statement of Facts is an 
over-generalization since the witnesses that testified did not 
substantiate the observations made by Dr. Stewart and said 
statement of facts does not refer to any specific transcript 
citations. 
In paragraph 9 of Appellee's Statement of Facts, Appellee 
refers to conflicting evidence; however, the citations made do 
not indicate conflicting evidence as to plaintiff's testimony 
regarding the checks that she presented to her mother for day 
care costs. 
II 
DR. STEWART'S RECOMMENDATION WAS NOT UPDATED 
AND THE COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER THE FACTORS 
OF STABILITY FOR THE MINOR CHILD AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
WITH HER SISTERf BRANDI 
First of all, in Appellee's Argument relating to the Court 
giving greater weight to Dr. Stewart's evaluation than Dr. Swaner 
2 
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or Dr. McManemin's testimony, the Appellee stated at page 11 of 
his Brief that Dr. Stewart interviewed Paige's day care provider 
and performed an MMPI and Rotter sentence completion test on 
Paige. Both representations are in error. At the time Dr. 
Stewart did her evaluation, Paige did not have a day care 
provider since she was only 10 months old and, further, there 
were no tests performed on Paige due to her age. 
Again, the Court seemed to ignore the evidence presented 
by Dr. Swaner and Dr. McManemin in regards to the relationship of 
the minor child with her sister, Brandi, as well as the stability 
of the environment that the minor child was in. Specifically, 
the Court did not consider the fact that Dr. Stewart's evaluation 
was done 8-9 months before the Trial and that Dr. McManemin's and 
the day care provider, Myra Brodale's observations of the minor 
child during the 8-9 months prior to the Trial specifically 
indicated that the minor child was a happy, healthy and 
emotionally well-adjusted child and that her environment and 
present circumstances were extremely stable and emotionally 
rewarding to Paige. (Vol. II, T.24-29, Vol. II, T.58-59) 
Stability of the present custodial arrangements and 
circumstances for the minor child is a dominant factor as not 
only mentioned in the various cases dealing with custody of 
children but also in factors to be considered by an evaluator 
pursuant to Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
3 
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Administration. Specifically, that factor indicated that the 
evaluator must determine the general interest in continuing the 
previously determined custodial arrangements where the child is 
happy and well-adjusted. Not only was the child happy and 
well-adjusted during the first 18 months of her life wherein the 
plaintiff had custody but the only evidence presented to the 
Court regarding the same was that of both Dr. Swaner who found 
that both Paige and her sister were doing extremely well and 
there was no reason to disturb the present custody arrangement 
and the stability of the circumstances. Dr. Stewart only 
indicated that the child was young enough to make a change but 
did not present very much evidence in regards to the trauma that 
would occur with the minor child by changing the custody. More 
specifically, Dr. Stewart did not do an update in regards to her 
evaluation and could present no evidence whatsoever to the Court 
in regards to what occurred during the eight months prior to the 
Trial when the bonding between Paige and her sister, Brandi, 
increased dramatically and the stability of the custodial 
arrangement with the plaintiff became more and more apparent. Dr. 
McManemin, who observed the minor child Paige a few weeks before 
the Trial/ indicated that there was a very close relationship 
between Paige and Brandi and that, again, it would not be in 
Paige's best interest to upset that relationship or the stability 
which Paige had being in the custody of her mother. (Vol. Ill, 
T.59) 
4 
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Since the Court did not adequately consider those factors 
and Dr. Stewart did not consider the factors during the previous 
eight months prior to the Trial the Court abused its discretion 
in not considering the evidence of Dr. Swaner and Dr. McManemin 
and Myra Brodale, the day care provider, regards to the stability 
of the minor child, Paige, and her relationship with her sister, 
Brandi, during the immediate eight months prior to the Trial. 
The Court seemed to ignore the only evidence that was 
presented to it in regards to the trauma that would occur with 
the minor child due to her separation from her primary caretaker, 
the plaintiff. Specifically, Dr. McManemin's testimony (Vol. 
Ill, T.55-63) indicated that at the age of the minor child, Paige, 
that she not be separated from her mother who was the primary 
caretaker and that it would be traumatic. In fact, it has proven 
to be traumatic for Paige. Further, Dr. McManemin testified as 
to the bonding with the minor child, Brandi, that had been 
observed just prior to the Trial and not 8 or 9 months prior 
thereto when Dr. Stewart did her evaluation. The evidence was 
that both Brandi and Paige were happy, well-adjusted children and 
very closely bonded and, further, that Paige did not want to be 
with her father. 
The Court definitely abused its discretion in not 
considering the evidence of Dr. McManemin in regards to the minor 
child at the time of the Trial and should not have given so much 
5 
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credibility to observations made by Dr. Stewart 8 or 9 months 
prior thereto. 
Ill 
THE VISITATION AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
RESTRICTIVE AND NOT BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE 
THE COURT 
Appellee, on page 16 of his Brief, makes a statement that 
the visitation schedule is no more restrictive than the then 
existing District Court Standard Visitation Schedule and refers 
to Volume I, T. 152. However, there is nothing in the transcript 
which would support said statement since the only reference to 
the same is in a question asked by an attorney and is not 
evidence that was presented to the Court by any of the witnesses. 
The fact remains that the visitation awarded by the Court was 
restrictive and did not give the plaintiff overnight visitation. 
The Court's standard visitation schedule only deals with 
school-age children and there was no suggested schedule in 
regards to children under that age. Further, Appellee, on page 
17 of his Brief, states that there was testimony that overnight 
visitation could be detrimental to Paige. Again, there is no 
citation to the transcript and said statement is totally 
inaccurate. There was no evidence presented to the Court that 
overnight visitation with Paige's mother, plaintiff, would be 
detrimental to Paige. In fact, the evidence was that the 
plaintiff had custody of Paige during the first 18 months of her 
life and the transcript is void of any evidence presented to the 
Court that continuing any overnight visitation with the plaintiff 
fi 
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would have any detrimental effect whatsoever upon the minor 
child, Paige. The evidence supported to the contrary since both 
Dr. McManemin, Dr. Swaner and Myra Brodale testified that the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the minor child, Paige, 
was healthy and that said minor child was happy, well-adjusted 
and doing fine. Again, the testimony of Dr. Swaner was that the 
defendant, Mr. Evans, should not have overnight visitation 
because he was not the primary caretaker. Dr. Swaner was never 
asked about overnight visitation with the plaintiff and, in fact, 
there was not any evidence presented to the Court whatsoever in 
regards to the plaintiff being awarded overnight visitation. 
Further, as was stated in Appellant's initial Brief the findings 
of the Court are totally void of any finding in regards to why 
the plaintiff's visitation was restricted so that she could not 
have any overnight visitation. Denying the plaintiff said 
liberal visitation, specifically overnight visitation, was 
totally inequitable under the circumstance of the evidence 
presented to the Court and manifested a clear abuse of discretion 
and a bias of the trial court against the plaintiff, and was not 
in the best interest of the minor child. 
IV 
THE COURT MISINTERPRETED THE EVIDENCE IN ORDERING THE 
PLAINTIFF TO PAY $1,500.00 TO DR. STEWART 
First of all, there was no evidence presented to the Court 
7 
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i 
that Dr. Stewart's fee was, in fact, $3,000.00. The truth is < 
that Dr. Stewart's fee was $2,500.00 and then after the Trial she 
charged an additional $500.00 for her appearance in Court. It 
seems not only inequitable but an abuse of discretion to order < 
the plaintiff to pay for Dr. Stewart's Court appearance when the 
Court had to pay for the Court appearances of her two expert 
witnesses, Dr. Swaner and Dr. McManemin, especially when the < 
defendant's income far exceeded the plaintiff's. Plaintiff did 
suffer inequities and she not only lost custody of the minor 
child but lost income of child support of $195.00 per month and < 
had to start paying child support of $153.00 per month. She also 
had to pay all of her own attorney's fees and then was stuck with 
an additional $1,500.00 payment to the defendant for Dr. Stewart ( 
when, in fact, the defendant's income was almost $1,000.00 a 
month more than the plaintiff's. Further, the Court makes no 
specific finding as to why the Court felt that the plaintiff 
should pay one-half of not only Dr. Stewart's fee but one-half of 
her fee for appearing at the Trial. 
V 
THE COURT IGNORED THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF AS TO THE DAY CARE COSTS 
At the Trial the plaintiff presented to the Court Exhibit 
"3n (Vol. I, T. 41-42), a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A". Said Exhibit "3" specifically was not only a 
8 
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summary of the day care costs incurred but the actual check 
numbers and copies of the checks indicating the total amount that 
the plaintiff paid for day care costs. 
The only conflicting evidence as suggested by the 
Appellee in his Reply Brief was that of plaintiff's half-sister 
who indicated that the money paid to plaintiff's mother was to 
pay for food. This was not conflicting evidence and did not 
contradict the evidence presented by the plaintiff that she had, 
in fact, paid her mother the $100.00 per month for the day care 
of the minor child, Paige. The Trial Court clearly committed 
error in not awarding to plaintiff one-half her day care costs 
since the Court ordered the plaintiff to pay to defendant 
one-half of any day care costs incurred after the change of 
custody. The mere fact that plaintiff's mother testified that 
she told a lending institution that she was not charging the 
plaintiff day care is not sufficient evidence to indicate that, 
in fact, the plaintiff had not paid her mother for the day care 
since the evidence clearly indicated that she has as evidenced by 
the checks and the notations thereon that they were for day care. 
Plaintiff should have been awarded judgment against the defendant 
for one-half of her day care costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's award of custody to defendant was an abuse of 
discretion and should be reversed and custody awarded to the 
plaintiff, the primary caretaker of the minor child. 
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The visitation awarded to the plaintiff was restrictive in 
nature and showed a definite lack of concern by the Trial Court 
as to the effect on the minor child since the plaintiff had been 
the primary caretaker during the first 18 months of said minor 
child's life and there was no evidence presented which would 
support the Court's decision to restrict overnight visitation 
with the plaintiff. 
Both the Court's Order denying plaintiff her day care 
expenses and ordering her to pay one-half of Dr. Stewart's 
evaluation were unsupported by the evidence and abuse of 
discrfetion and should be reversed with a redetermination in 
regards to the same. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of November, 1993. 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OP NAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of Appellant's Reply 
Brief to Randy S. Ludlow, Attorney for Appellee, 311 South State 
Street, Suite 280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 15th day of 
November, 1993, postage prepaid. 
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